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“ALTOONA WAS HIS, AND FAIRLY WON”: 
PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE ALTOONA 
GOVERNORS’ CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1862 
 
Kees Thompson 
 
When the first shells blasted into the walls of Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, the doors of the starting gate flew 
open, and the dogs of war finally sprung free as the 
American Civil War commenced. Immediately, the 
Commander-in-Chief went to work. While coordinating 
with U.S. Secretary of War Simon Cameron to reinforce 
the southern border, he called upon his citizens to take up 
arms and enlist. He ordered the presidents of the local 
railroads to halt all shipments of “contraband” heading 
south, and he instructed telegraph lines to cease all 
communication that included troop movements. To lead the 
troops, he tapped Captain George B. McClellan, known as 
a wunderkind in military circles. To solidify strategy, the 
chief called on all of the western governors for a 
conference in Cleveland to discuss war strategy and an 
invasion of the South. Furthermore, he aggressively 
supported the separatist movement in western Virginia, 
stationing an army at the border under McClellan, who later 
invaded, routed the lingering Confederate forces, and 
secured the government of what would become the new 
state of West Virginia.1 
                                                 
1 William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 158-59, 162-63; The War of the Rebellion: A 
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 Much has been written and debated about the “war 
powers” of President Abraham Lincoln, especially in the 
first months of his presidency before Congress convened. 
But the aforementioned actions were not justified by the 
President’s war powers, as they were not taken by President 
Lincoln at all; rather, the leader described above is actually 
William Dennison Jr., Governor and “Commander-in-
Chief” of the state of Ohio at the outset of the Civil War. 
Even as one of the more ineffective governors, especially in 
managing finances and organizing the state militia, 
Governor Dennison still clearly wielded an enormous 
amount of power, not only in his own state but nationally. 
Indeed, at the start of the war, the Union was truly that: a 
union of (the remaining) states who at times acted 
independently yet whose power was always compounded 
when they acted in concert. The culmination of this united 
power and influence was supposed to manifest itself at the 
Loyal War Governors’ Conference of September 1862.   
Also called the “Altoona Conference” for its 
location at the central Pennsylvania railroad junction, the 
gathering has mostly been relegated to the footnotes of 
history, largely forgotten in the grand narratives of the Civil 
War and the Lincoln administration. Indeed, events 
immediately preceding the gathering—most notably the 
                                                                                                 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies (Cornell University Library, 1880-1901), series 3, I, 101-04; 
Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and 
Soldiers (New York: Moore, Wilstach, and Baldwin, 1868), 1: 41-42; 
Richard H. Abbott, Ohio’s War Governors (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 1962), 18-19. 
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“victory” at the Battle of Antietam and the subsequent 
announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation—
seemingly rendered the conference moot. When it is 
mentioned, the Altoona Conference is characterized as 
another one of the war’s “close calls” in which President 
Lincoln escaped an organized revolt of his governors by the 
favorable preceding events. Lincoln did surely respect the 
prestige and power, both military and political, of the 
governors. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that, far from a 
surprise obstacle, the Altoona Conference was partly the 
contrivance of Lincoln himself, who intended for it to be 
linked to the Emancipation Proclamation and have it serve 
as a political buttress for his most controversial presidential 
order.2 
 In order to properly assess the motivation for, and 
significance of, the conference, it is important to first 
examine the context of the conference and Lincoln’s 
relationship with the governors. At the outset of the war, 
most Northern states and their governors were extremely 
enthusiastic about the war, with their constituents enlisting 
in droves. In fact, the state of Ohio raised men so quickly 
that there was no way to house or feed them all, and they 
sat idly in the state capital, awaiting orders. The War 
Department under Simon Cameron scrambled to gather 
supplies and organize the mass of militia units scattered 
across the cities of the North, yet it suffered from a fatal 
lack of efficiency, especially in the face of complaints from 
                                                 
2 Tarring S. Davis and Lucile Shenk, eds. A History of Blair County 
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: National Historical Association, 1931), 1: 
90. 
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leaders in every state, each with his own opinion on the 
correct course of action for both his army and the effort as a 
whole. Each governor acted like a distinct “war minister” 
with duties stretching from raising war funds to retrieving 
the bodies of dead constituents to commissioning officers 
in the regiments from his state. This last duty triggered 
much friction with the War Department, as patronage 
became a political battleground as the war progressed and 
the armies of the nation became increasingly nationalized.3 
 Nevertheless, all of the enthusiasm that burst forth 
after Fort Sumter dwindled as the months dragged on, and 
it was all but trampled after the First Battle of Bull Run, 
when it became clear that the war would not simply be a 
glorious march straight into Richmond. By the early 
months of 1862, the governors and Lincoln Administration 
were at a near stalemate over recruiting. The Radical 
Republican governors, especially those in New England led 
by the fiery John Andrew of Massachusetts, blamed 
Lincoln’s policies for slow recruiting numbers as well as 
the overall lack of progress in the war. The Radicals argued 
that the dearth of enthusiasm stemmed from an uninspiring 
foundation for the war itself; a public commitment that the 
war was one definitively fought to erase the evil of slavery 
                                                 
3 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 148-154; Reid, Ohio in 
the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and Soldiers, 1: 28; William B. 
Weeden, War Government, Federal and State, in Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania and Indiana, 1861-1865 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1906), xi-xii; Stephen Engle, All the President’s Statesmen: 
Northern Governors and the American Civil War, ed. A. Kristen 
Foster, Frank L. Klement Lectures 15 (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2006), 11. 
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would demoralize the South and rally the North in spirit 
and manpower, leading to victory.  Moreover, they desired 
a purge of the army, replacing moderate or Democratic 
generals such as McClellan with those such as John C. 
Fremont, who was the darling of the Radicals for his 
attempts to implement emancipation in Missouri against the 
will of Lincoln. McClellan was detested by the Radicals, 
who saw him as wholly incompetent and who were 
outraged by his public stance against the emancipation of 
slaves.4 
 Lincoln had to resist the Radicals, although he 
shared in some of their sentiments. Lincoln was by no 
means ambivalent towards slavery, yet he was wary of 
sudden, widespread emancipation across the nation. More 
importantly, Lincoln was held in check by perpetual fear of 
the reactions of the borders states; in many ways, the war, 
and even the fate of the capital, rested on their placation. 
But the Radicals, who controlled Congress, were constantly 
attempting to ram through legislation to remold the war 
effort into more of an abolitionist crusade. Lincoln, ever the 
compromiser in a manner that would make his idol Henry 
Clay proud, attempted to combat the wave of abolitionist 
fervor with a moderate plan for compensated emancipation. 
Although compensated emancipation was approved for 
                                                 
4 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 242; William B. 
Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the 
Emancipation Proclamation,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography 71, no. 3 (July 1947): 196; Alexander K. McClure, 
Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times: Some Personal Recollections 
of War and Politics during the Lincoln Administration (Philadelphia: 
Times Publishing, 1892), 91. 
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Washington D.C., Lincoln’s plan was met with disdain 
from both sides of the issue, especially in in the Border 
States.5 
 By the summer of 1862, tensions between Lincoln 
and the Radicals were rising with each passing day. After 
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign ended in utter failure, 
additional troops were needed more than ever, yet the 
governors seemed indifferent to this new call for troops, 
which simply joined the continual stream of calls sent 
throughout the year. Even when Washington itself was 
supposedly threatened by General Stonewall Jackson, 
response from the governors was sluggish. Thus, Lincoln 
knew he must incite the governors politically. Secretary of 
State Seward, acting in concert with Lincoln, left 
Washington in late June of 1862 to personally call on the 
mayors of Philadelphia, New York, and Boston in an 
apparent attempt to bypass the governors and enlist the help 
of the mayors.6   
The governors were greatly alarmed by this 
development, fearing the power that would shift to Lincoln 
if he were able to recruit without his “war ministers.” 
Andrew Curtin, the pro-Lincoln governor of Pennsylvania, 
intervened on behalf of his fellow leaders and met with 
Seward while the Secretary was in New York. In a meeting 
                                                 
5 Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings: 1859-1865, ed. Don E. 
Fehrenbacher (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1989), 
585-6; McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 92; 
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 242-244; John G. Nicolay 
and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New York: Century, 
1890), 109-11. 
6 Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, 113, 117-19. 
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on June 30, 1862, at the Astor House, Governor Curtin, 
Seward, and Governor Morgan of New York agreed that 
the raising of troops was a gubernatorial prerogative, and 
the governors agreed to affix their signatures to a public 
letter, pre-written for them by Seward and Lincoln, stating 
a belief that “the decisive moment [of the war] is near at 
hand” and explicitly asking President Lincoln to call for 
more reinforcements. This letter was then sent out to the 
other governors, eighteen of whom signed the letterS some 
even delivered the letters personally to the thankful 
President. 7 
 Nevertheless, Andrew Curtin was not just another 
one of the many governors with whom Lincoln and his 
Cabinet had to deal in order to conduct the war effort. 
Rather, Curtin and Lincoln were political allies, and the 
President counted this particular governor as somewhat of a 
confidant. Indeed, Curtin biographer Alexander McClure, 
himself an influential Republican politician and patronage-
wielder in Pennsylvania, wrote: 
 
Many circumstances combined to bring 
Lincoln and Curtin into the closest official 
and personal relations from Lincoln’s 
[presidential] nomination until his 
death…the nomination of Lincoln was made 
possible by two men – Henry S. Lane of 
Indiana and Curtin of Pennsylvania…The 
                                                 
7 Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation 
Proclamation,” 197-99; Official Records, series 3, I, 181-82. 
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appointment of [Curtin’s in-state rival] 
Cameron to the Lincoln Cabinet was 
regarded by Curtin as unfortunate, and 
would have made very strained relations 
between [them] had not both been singularly 
generous in all their impulses and 
actions…there was never a shadow upon the 
relations of these two men. Curtin was 
profoundly loyal and an enthusiast in 
everything pertaining to the war.8 
 
Thus, when Seward met with Curtin in New York, the 
governor was naturally a willing participant in the ploy to 
aid his Commander-in-Chief.  The success of the 
governors’ call for more troops—eventually allowing 
Lincoln to settle on asking for an astounding 300,000 more 
troops—was not likely lost on either man, especially 
looking toward the future, with Lincoln’s relationship with 
the other governors unlikely to ameliorate because of the 
lingering dissension over war strategy.9 
 With the failure of Lincoln’s attempts at seeking a 
compromise regarding emancipation and increased pressure 
from Radicals in Congress, the President began to chart a 
new course. In late June of 1862, Lincoln undertook the 
drafting of his Emancipation Proclamation; a month later, 
Lincoln called together his Cabinet and surprised them with 
his draft of the document. The following discussion 
                                                 
8 McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 232. 
9 William Marvel, Lincoln’s Darkest Year: The War in 1862 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2008), 81-83. 
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revealed a deeply divided Cabinet, much more so than 
Lincoln had anticipated. Much of the criticism surrounded 
the timing of the document, with Secretary Seward warning 
of its possible effect on European nations eager to intervene 
in the conflict. Thus, unbeknownst to the public or the 
governors at large, Lincoln’s draft for emancipation was 
tucked quietly into his desk, awaiting an opportune 
moment.10 
 In early September, a panic swept the North. 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee, emboldened by recent 
victories and hoping to influence the coming elections in 
the North, invaded Maryland. Furthermore, to the outrage 
of many of the Northern Governors, as well as his Cabinet, 
Lincoln restored the cashiered McClellan to his command. 
Secretary Chase, who as a Radical had no love for the 
General and believed he “ought to be shot,” led a group of 
Cabinet members in a confrontation with Lincoln in which 
they delivered a signed protest regarding McClellan’s 
service. Lincoln was forced to defend McClellan, arguing 
that he was best equipped for defensive tactics in the area. 
Furthermore, Lincoln had not only once again rejected calls 
for the admittance of African-American soldiers, but he 
openly threatened the governors with a possible national 
draft.11    
                                                 
10Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 247-48; Guelzo, 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America, 
118-24. 
11Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of 
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 478-79; 
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 250-52. 
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 With events unraveling in the capital, Governor 
Andrew called a clandestine meeting of the New England 
governors. Under the auspices of attendance at the 
commencement ceremony of Brown University in 
Providence, five of the six New England governors met 
with three representatives from the National War 
Committee, a newly established, Radical-dominated 
committee based in New York. The governors discussed 
their views on the war as well as the President’s policies 
and Cabinet. After much discussion, those in attendance 
formally agreed that “the unanimous choice of New 
England was for a change of the cabinet and a change in the 
generals” and sent the New York delegates to Washington 
to convey their message. The delegates, upon their arrival, 
met with Lincoln personally, yet they immediately clashed 
with the President, who accused them of a zealous hatred 
for Seward and dismissed their pleas as immaterial.12 
Lincoln was not wrong in his characterization of the 
Radicals’ feelings towards his Secretary of State; the 
Radical wing of the party had distrusted Seward since the 
crisis at Ft. Sumter and the day his stint as Secretary of 
State began. Specifically, they charged him with being too 
complacent and conciliatory in his negotiations with the 
South, paralleling the complacent McClellan, whom he 
championed. Likewise, they believed Seward was the 
greatest obstacle preventing the Lincoln Administration 
from fully embracing abolitionism. This impression of 
                                                 
12 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 252-53; Hesseltine and 
Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation Proclamation,” 
199. 
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Seward was linked to the popular Radical belief that 
Lincoln was ineffectual as president and was simply the 
political puppet of Seward. Joseph Medill, a prominent 
Republican as the editor of the partisan Chicago Tribune, 
wrote: “Seward must be got out of the Cabinet. He is 
Lincoln’s evil genius. He has been President de facto, and 
has kept a sponge of chloroform to Uncle Abe’s nose all 
the while, except one or two brief spells…” Thus, 
Lincoln’s vehement defense of Seward to the New York 
delegates did nothing to assuage the New England 
governors’ fears of Lincoln’s inefficacy as the leader of his 
administration.13 
 It was in this contentious climate, perhaps the 
“darkest hour of the war,” that the idea for a meeting of all 
of the governors of the loyal states began to emerge. 
Governor Andrew, incensed over Lincoln’s rebuff of the 
New York delegates, arrogantly claimed to an acquaintance 
that he was “sadly but firmly trying to organize some 
movement, if possible, to save the president from the 
infamy of ruining our country.” But Governor Andrew was 
not alone in his sentiment. Leaders across the nation, 
mostly Radicals, welcomed the idea of a governors’ 
conference, one whose result Lincoln would actually listen 
to and perhaps even trigger his resignation. Indeed, there 
was no denying that the unofficial grumblings for the 
                                                 
13 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1995), 401; Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1899), 2: 361-64.  
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conference had a distinct Radical and anti-Lincoln air about 
them.14 
 Governor Curtin, a disciple of Lincoln’s more 
moderate approach to issues such as emancipation and the 
Border States, was suspicious of the plans brewing and 
believed that the governors should convene, not to assail 
the President but to show their support. The first official 
mention of the conference appeared when Governor Curtin 
contacted Governor Andrew in early September of 1862.15 
Governor Curtin’s message was simple: “In the present 
emergency, would it not be well if the loyal governors 
should meet at some point in the Border States to take 
measures for a more active support of the government?” 
Andrew, who could not refuse such an offer and then 
subsequently call for a conference himself, replied that he 
would indeed attend such a conference. Within a week, an 
                                                 
14 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 253. 
15 Sources seem to conflict over the timing and the context of the 
original conception of the official Altoona Conference. Several 
reputable sources claim that the inspiration was born back when 
Governor Curtin was in New York alongside Secretary Seward. Most 
allude to the account of John Russell Young, who wrote an excerpt 
entitled “Curtin and the Altoona Conference” for William Egle’s 1896 
biography of Curtin. Young supposedly consulted an account by 
Governor Austin Blair of Michigan for his information on the entire 
conference.  But Governor Blair was unable to attend the conference 
itself, and it seems more likely that the incorrect assumption of the 
inspiration occurring in New York stems from a misinterpretation of 
Governor Curtin’s letter to A.K. McClure dated Feb. 16, 1892 (partly 
reproduced below). By neglecting the wording in “Governor Andrew 
afterward acquiesced, and I then wrote him…” (emphasis added), one 
could mistakenly assume that Curtin’s and Andrew’s correspondence 
occurred in a single event—coinciding with Curtin’s meeting with 
Seward in New York on June 30-July 1, 1862. 
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invitation was sent out to all of the governors from Curtin 
as well as two of his fellow moderate governors: David Tod 
of Ohio and Francis Harrison Pierpont of West Virginia.16   
 Attendance at the conference was impressive, 
considering the ten day notice and the present situation in 
many of the states, with governors from the Midwest to 
New England to the Border States. Nevertheless, very few 
sparks flew when all of the delegates first assembled in the 
Logan House on September 24. Civil War historian 
William Hesseltine argues that the victory at Antietam and 
subsequent Emancipation Proclamation, announced a mere 
day before the conference, completely took the wind out of 
the sails of the conference.  He writes: 
 
Hence the governors assembled in Altoona 
with the Emancipation Proclamation 
hanging over them. The astute Lincoln had 
cut the ground from under the Radicals, and, 
politicians as they all were, they knew it. 
Governor Curtin, with an uncontrollable 
twinkle in his eye, met his 
colleagues…[who included] Tod…and 
Pierpont, a New England delegation of 
Maine’s Israel Washburne, Rhode Island’s 
William Sprague, and New Hampshire’s 
Nathaniel Berry, a Midwestern group 
consisting of Illinois’s Yates, Wisconsin’s 
Edward Saloman, and Iowa’s Samuel 
                                                 
16 Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 254. 
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Kirkwood, while Maryland’s Augustus 
Bradford and New Jersey’s Charles Olden 
represented eastern moderates. Indiana’s 
Oliver P. Morton had sent one D.J. Rose as 
his personal representative. New York’s 
Edwin D. Morgan…had refused to attend. 
Connecticut’s William Buckingham was still 
enroute, and Michigan’s Austin Blair 
was…too busy…to journey to Altoona.17 
 
Hesseltine argues that, despite the later defensive 
protests from Republicans and even, once, from Lincoln 
himself, the impending conference was extremely 
influential in forcing the Emancipation Proclamation out of 
the desk of Lincoln, or at least in its timing; with the threat 
of a united front of governors against him looming, like 
that emerging from their previous gathering in Providence, 
Lincoln was forced to maneuver, albeit skillfully, and “cut 
the ground” from under the Radicals.18 
 By examining the account written by Governor 
Curtin himself, however, we see a different picture of the 
conference—and Lincoln’s relationship with his 
governors—emerge. Instead of fearing the conference of 
his governors as if it was some sort of attempted “Second 
Hartford Convention,” as claimed later by the bitter 
Democratic press, Lincoln actually embraced the idea of a 
conference. Writing a letter years afterward to his good 
                                                 
17Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation 
Proclamation,” 202. 
18 Ibid., 196, 199-202. 
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friend and political ally Alexander McClure, Curtin 
recollected: 
 
[After agreeing to the conference and 
dispensing invitations]… Governor Andrew, 
Governor Tod, and myself consulted Mr. 
Lincoln, and he highly approved of our 
purpose. In that interview he did not attempt 
to conceal the fact that we were upon the 
eve of an Emancipation policy, and he had 
from us the assurance that the Altoona 
conference would cordially endorse such a 
policy. All that was done at the Altoona 
conference had the positive approval of 
President Lincoln in advance, and he well 
understood that the whole purpose of the 
movement was to strengthen his hands and 
support the bolder policy that all then knew 
was inevitable. The address presented to Mr. 
Lincoln from the Altoona conference was 
prepared by Governor Andrew and myself. I 
did not then doubt that it would lose us the 
coming election in Pennsylvania, and so said 
to Mr. Lincoln, but I believed that the 
country then knew what the war was about, 
and that it was time to bring slavery to the 
front as the great issue.19 
 
                                                 
19 McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 270-72. 
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In this view, Lincoln was not forced to deviate from his 
plans based on the conference nor outmaneuver his own 
“war ministers.” Rather, Lincoln acted in a manner he so 
desired from his generals: he observed the looming 
possibility of a governors’ conference as an opportunity 
and marched out to meet it head-on, welcoming it and 
converting it into an advantage. Thus, the conference 
became a boon for Lincoln, shoring up support 
immediately after his issuance of the document which 
would earn him the moniker “The Great Emancipator.”20   
 The “address” to which Curtin refers is the final 
result of the discussions of the conference, which was 
published in newspapers as well as presented to Lincoln 
himself in person. Although there was some discussion of 
divisive topics such as the judgment of those in command, 
with the radicals still out for the blood of McClellan, the 
final document amounted to a simple yet stalwart 
proclamation in favor of Lincoln’s most recent actions, 
with the exception of the reinstatement of McClellan, who 
was not mentioned anywhere in the document. In the 
address, the Emancipation Proclamation was officially 
supported, although it was far from worshipped by the 
Radicals such Andrew, who later called it “a poor 
document,” rife with strategic blunders, “but still a mighty 
act.” Other provisions included those that expressed direct 
loyalty to the President and his constitutional war powers, 
asked him to raise and hold 100,000 men in reserve for 
emergencies, and, of course, celebrated the heroism of the 
                                                 
20 Engle, All the President’s Statesmen, 21. 
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Union soldiers. Although not all of the governors affixed 
their signatures, including the elected chairman of the 
conference, Governor Bradford, who heeded the desires of 
his Border State constituents, twelve governors signed it 
that day, with more afterwards, as some non-attending 
governors endorsed it after it was sent to them. Indeed, the 
mostly non-divisive final document could not have been 
written better by Lincoln himself, who would benefit from 
the united address of the governors endorsing his 
Emancipation Proclamation.21 
 Following the two-day conference, the attending 
governors traveled to Washington and met with the 
President in the White House on September 26. The 
meeting began with an uncomfortable level of courtesy yet 
was actually highly productive, as Lincoln listened 
patiently to the governors’ suggestions on a myriad of 
issues dealing with the logistics of the war effort, many 
times even requesting written recommendations from the 
governors. As the long interview progressed, the effects of 
emancipation were discussed as was the war effort. Finally, 
Governor Kirkwood of Iowa expressed concern over 
General McClellan, the lack of confidence he engendered 
around the nation, and even Lincoln’s own ability to 
control him. In an account written nearly thirty years after 
the fact, Governor Kirkwood recounts his version of both 
the conference at Altoona and the resulting meeting with 
                                                 
21Davis and Shenk, eds. A History of Blair County Pennsylvania, 1: 91; 
William H. Egle and John Russell Young, Life and Times of Andrew 
Gregg Curtin (Philadelphia: Thompson Publishing, 1896), 318-20; 
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 256. 
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President Lincoln at the White House. On approaching 
discussion of the contentious issue of McClellan’s 
command, Kirkwood writes:  
 
I said to the President that I spoke only for 
the Iowa people; that in their judgment, Gen. 
McClellan was unfit to command his army; 
that his army was well clothed, well armed, 
well disciplined, were fighting in a cause as 
good as men ever fought for, and fought as 
bravely as men ever fought, and yet were 
continually whipped, and our people did not 
think he was a good general who was always 
whipped. Mr. Lincoln smiled in his genial 
way and said “You Iowa people, then, judge 
generals as you do lawyers, by their success 
in trying cases.” I replied, “Yes, something 
like that; the lawyer who is always losing his 
cases especially when he was right and had 
justice on his side, don’t get much practice 
in Iowa.”22  
 
Nevertheless, the tone of the discussion shifted 
starkly when Kirkwood pressed Lincoln, even going so far 
as to suggest that “the administration [was] afraid to 
remove Gen. McClellan.” Lincoln, with incredible 
calmness and tact, stated: “If I believed our cause would be 
                                                 
22 Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood, 
Iowa’s War Governor (Iowa City: Author, 1893), 229. 
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benefited by removing General McClellan tomorrow, I 
would remove him tomorrow. I do not believe so today, but 
if the time shall come when I shall so believe, I will remove 
him promptly, and not till then.” Thus, directly, honestly, 
and laying out his full intentions before him—paralleling 
the development of the Altoona Conference—Lincoln 
deftly won over the situation, ending the meeting after that 
very statement.23 
 The view of the Altoona Conference as a more open 
and direct contrivance departs from those that depict the 
conference and its surrounding events as yet another lucky 
escape by Lincoln from a political disaster. But it does not 
necessarily signify that Lincoln was any more or less 
politically savvy. In Hesseltine’s interpretation of events, 
Lincoln faced a daunting showdown yet managed to not 
only avoid losing the Border States or being steamrolled by 
the Radicals but also to transform the situation into one in 
which the governors reinforced him and personally handed 
him a mandate on one of his most decisive decisions. In 
this essay’s view, in which Lincoln welcomed the 
conference, he is blessed with tremendous foresight, 
recognizing opportunity in a conference of governors 
before its conception. Furthermore, if Lincoln was being 
truthful when Republicans, in the face of staunch 
Democratic conspiracy theories regarding the 
Emancipation Proclamation, extracted from him the 
statement, “I never thought of the governors at all. When 
                                                 
23Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation 
Proclamation,” 203-04; Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. 
Kirkwood, 230; Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 260. 
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Lee came over the Potomac, I made a resolve that if 
McClellan drove him back I would send the Proclamation 
after him,” then he certainly is the consummate genius of 
political engineering—or at least the luckiest.24 
But this revised view of the Altoona Conference 
and its connection to Lincoln’s actions raises numerous 
tantalizing questions. What did Lincoln expect the political 
climate to be like for the conference, considering he so 
thoroughly embraced the idea of the conference in the 
war’s darkest hour? Was he somehow certain of 
McClellan’s impending victory, even though it would 
eventually hinge on the improbable discovery of Lee’s 
strategic plans for his Maryland Campaign? If not, and 
without a victory to hang it on, how could Lincoln have 
promised governors such as Curtin that the release of the 
Emancipation Proclamation was imminent? Perhaps it is 
possible that the Altoona Conference was even Lincoln’s 
reserve card: grandly announcing emancipation alongside 
his united “war ministers” at their conference of unyielding 
support for the Union cause could be a powerful statement. 
In fact, maybe the Altoona Conference would have become 
the decisive event instead of Antietam, with endless 
scholarship analyzing every key moment. The Altoona 
Conference, although remaining a footnote in history, 
seemingly raises more questions than answers.  But these 
are questions that allow us to better investigate and attempt 
to understand the motivations and decisions of certainly 
                                                 
24 Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the 
Emancipation Proclamation,” 195. 
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one of the most enigmatic leaders in our nation’s history, a 
true political general, and his approach towards a most 
precarious expedition. 
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